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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Appellee will respond to the issues raised in Appellant's
Brief and the order raised by Appellant.
The standard of review for each of the issues raised as
stated by the Appellant is the clearly erroneous and abuse of
discretion standard.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee strongly objects to a number of the exhibits
contained in Appellant's brief.

Many of the exhibits are not

matters of record and are therefore not appropriate exhibits in
an appellate brief.

The exhibits to which Appellee objects are

Exhibit C, Exhibit F, Exhibit H, Exhibit I, and Exhibit J.

These

exhibits are not appropriately before this Court and should not
be used in the Court's determination of the issues presented.
A,

Nature and Disposition of the Case

This is a claim for property damage brought by the
Appellant pursuant to an accident which occurred on or about
March 26, 1989, in Provo, Utah.

Late at night, the Appellant was

pulling into a 7-11 gas station when he struck cement filled
steel posts which were placed beside the gas pump island.
Appellant, the plaintiff in the proceedings below, filed a
1

The

complaint against Southland Corporation ("Southland") on or about
October 21, 1989.

Trial was scheduled for July 16, 1990. The

Appellant failed to appear at the trial. Appellant has blamed
this failure to appear on his medical condition.

Counsel for the

Appellee, the defendant in the proceedings below, appeared at
trial.

Pursuant to that proceeding an order of dismissal was

entered in favor of Southland.
Appellant filed a motion for new trial and a notice of
appeal on or about July 29, 1990. Appellant's motion for a new
trial was denied on or about September 29, 1990.
B.

Statement of Facts

Due to the fact that Appellant failed to appear for the
trial, no adequate trial record of the proceedings below has been
created.

Therefore, it is difficult to support the factual

statements by citation to the transcript as is proper.

A copy of

the entire proceedings before Third Circuit Court Judge Paul
Grant (three pages), is attached to this brief as Exhibit A.
When Mr. Barron failed to appear for trial, Appellee's
counsel made a motion to dismiss and a claim for bad faith.
Appellee's counsel listed a number of cases in which the
Appellant was currently or recently involved.

In his discussion

of these cases, Appellee's counsel stated that all of them had
been dismissed.

Appellee's counsel did not go into the

background or nature of the dismissals of each case.
2

The purpose

for discussing each of these different cases was to show that
none of these cases had been pursued to a judgment, and,
moreover, none of these cases had resulted in a judgment in favor
of the Appellant.
Appellant filed a motion for a new trial on July 29, 1990.
This motion was denied by the trial judge on September 29, 1990.
On two separate occasions, October 1, 1989, and January or
February 1990, the Appellant made objections and motions for
sanctions under URCP Rule 11 against defense counsel for alleged
violations of that rule. At the time this case was dismissed on
July 31, 1990, the trial court had not rendered decisions on
those motions.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

A claim of "fraud upon the court" by one of the

parties under Utah law must be raised by filing an action
separate from the underlying case. As the Appellant failed to
raise a claim of "fraud upon the court" in the proper manner it
should not be addressed by this Court.

However, even if the

Court reaches the merits of this issue, Appellee's counsel did
not commit "fraud upon the court" since Appellee's counsel never
prevented the Appellant from presenting his position at trial.
Moreover, Appellee did not affirmatively misrepresent facts to
the trial court.
2.

The Appellant's motion for a new trial was
3

inappropriate under Rule 59(a)(3) since new trials are granted
under this section for accident or surprise at trial rather than
the inability of a party to attend the trial.

However, should

this Court reach the merits of this issue, the trial court judge
properly denied the motion for a new trial since there was not
sufficient evidence given by the Appellant to justify a new
trial.
3.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by

granting judgment to the Appellee while there were outstanding
Rule 11 motions against Appellee's counsel.

Rule 11 motions have

nothing to do with the merits of the case and do not preclude
judgment being entered.

Moreover, it is standard practice and it

is suggested that decisions regarding Rule 11 motions be delayed
until the end of litigation.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A. A CLAIM OF "FRAUD UPON THE COURT- IS
INAPPROPRIATELY BEFORE THIS COURT.
ALTERNATIVELY, APPELLEE'S COUNSEL DID NOT
COMMIT "FRAUD UPON THE COURT."
Appellant's claim for "fraud upon the court" is
inappropriately before this Court.

Under Utah lawf an action for

"fraud upon the court" must be raised in an action separate from
the action in which the alleged fraud took place.

"Fraud upon

the court" cannot be raised by a motion in the underlying case
and therefore cannot be a point of contention on appeal.
4

We believe and hold that where "fraud upon the
court" is the gravamen of the proceeding, such
proceeding must be pursued in an independent
action by filing a separate suit, paying the
statutory filing fee therefor (which was not
done here), and requiring the statutory
issuance and service of process.
Shaw v. Pilcher, 341 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah 1959).

See also:

McGavin v. McGavin, 494 P.2d 283, 284 (Utah 1972).
In the present case, as was the case in Shaw, the party
complaining of "fraud upon the court" has failed to raise that
claim in a separate proceeding.

The Appellant in the present

case has not filed a separate action, paid the statutory filing
fee, or perfected process as is required.

Therefore, the issue

of "fraud upon the court" is not properly before this Court and
should be dismissed.
B. THE ACTS COMPLAINED OP BY APPELLANT DO NOT
AMOUNT TO THE "FRAUD" NECESSARY FOR SETTING
ASIDE A JUDGMENT.
Under Utah law, in order to use fraud to set aside a
judgment, it must be the type of fraud which "has the effect of
depriving the other party of the opportunity to present his claim
or defense."

Haner v. Haner, 373 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1962).

The Haner court continues:
This type of fraud, which is regarded as a
fraud not only upon the opponent, but on the
court itself, can be accomplished in a number
of ways, such as making false statements or
representations to the other party or to
witnesses to prevent them from contesting the
issues; or by that means or otherwise
preventing the attendance of the parties or
5

witnesses; or by destroying or secreting
evidence; so that a fair trial of the issues
is effectively prevented.
373 P.2d at 578-79.
The actions complained of by the Appellant do not fall
within any of the categories listed as appropriate categories for
the setting aside of judgment due to fraud.

The Appellee or

Appellee's counsel in no way prevented the Appellant from
appearing at trial or contesting his issues. Appellee and
counsel for Appellee simply appeared at trial and made the
appropriate motions in order to defend their position.
Appellee's counsel was not required to make Appellant's case for
him or to insure that the Appellant would be able to present his
claims at a later date.
It is the position of Appellee that Appellee's counsel did
not make any fraudulent misrepresentations to the court.
However, even if such statements had been made, they would not be
grounds for setting aside the judgment.

The Haner court

continues:
It is obvious that quite a different situation
exists where there is no prevention of the
party from contesting the issues in a trial
and where the complaint is simply that one
party presented perjured testimony or false
evidence. This charge is simply a
continuation of the same dispute which the
trial was supposed to resolve.
373 P.2d at 579.

6

Appellee vigorously denies that he presented any
fraudulent misrepresentation to the court.

However, even if

Appellee's counsel made a misstatement to the court, this is not
grounds for setting aside a judgment under Utah law.
C. APPELLEE'S COUNSEL MADE NO FRAUD OR
MISREPRESENTATION TO THE COURT.
At the July 16, 1990 hearing on Appellee's Motion to
Dismiss (see Exhibit A) Appellee's counsel represented to the
Court that the Appellant had recently filed numerous claims
against numerous defendants, and most, if not all of them, had
been dismissed.

Appellee's counsel then represented that he

thought that an additional case brought by the Appellant against
the State of Utah and the Utah State Tax Commission had been
dismissed.

Apparently, that case had been appealed to the United

States Supreme Court. Appellee's counsel made no representations
as to how or why these cases were dismissed.

The above

representations made to the trial court by Appellee's counsel do
not constitute "fraud upon the court."

Appellee's counsel

represented to the trial court that numerous other cases had been
filed by the Appellant at approximately the same time and had
been dismissed and did not elaborate further.

Appellee's counsel

had no duty to elaborate further and did not intentionally
misrepresent any of the facts pertaining to Appellant's other
litigation.

7

At page 24 of Appellant's brief, Appellant argues that ".
. . the canon of ethics require one to advise the court fully of
all material facts."

The Appellant does not offer any authority

for this proposition, but rather states:
Appellant does not offer any case law or other
authority because Appellant is not able to
undertake legal research at this time, because
he is not able to quickly or conveniently
locate and drive to a law library with
adequate resources appropriate to Utah law.
This argument is made in accordance with
standard ethical considerations.
Brief of Appellant, footnote 8, page 30.
There is absolutely no basis for the proposition that
"standard ethical considerations" require an opposing party to
make the case for his opponent.

The representations made by

Appellee's counsel to the trial court were substantially correct.
At page 25 of Appellant's brief, he states that defense
counsel "knowingly and with malicious intent" made false
statements to the trial court.

There is absolutely no evidence

presented that would support a finding of knowing and malicious
intent on the part of Appellee's counsel.

Rather, as has been

explained above, Appellee's counsel simply represented to the
trial court that the plaintiff had filed numerous other suits at
approximately the same time.
suits had been dismissed.

Moreover, most if not all those

While Appellant certainly has every

right to pursue remedies to valid claims in the judicial system,
it is uncommon for this amount of litigation to be pursued at one

8

time.

Appellee's counsel only wanted to point this out to the

court.
Under Utah law, Appellant's claim of "fraud against the
court" by Appellee's counsel is inappropriately before this
Court.

Also, the acts complained of by the Appellant do not

constitute the type of fraud by which a judgment can be set
aside.

If this Court feels it must reach the merits of this

issue, it is clear that Appellee's counsel's representations to
the trial court do not amount to "fraud upon the court."
POINT II.
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS
INAPPROPRIATE. EVEN IF THE MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL WAS APPROPRIATE, APPELLANT DID
NOT PROVIDE A SUFFICIENT BASIS ON WHICH A
NEW TRIAL COULD BE GRANTED.
Appellant claims he was unable to attend the July 16, 1990
trial because of mitral valve prolapse syndrome which renders him
incapacitated for hours at a time. Appellant claims that on the
day of the hearing he was incapacitated due to this illness.
Appellant based his motion for a new trial on Rule
59(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 59(a)(3)

states that a new trial may be granted for "accident or surprise,
which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against."

This

basis for a new trial is usually construed as requiring accident
or surprise at trial, rather than accident or surprise in
prohibiting attendance at trial.

See, Anderson v. Bradley, 590

9

P.2d 339 (Utah 1979); Powers v. Gene's Bldg Materials, I n c . 567
P.2d 174 (Utah 1977);

(A "surprise" at trial which could have

been easily guarded against by utilization of available discoveiry
procedures may not serve as a ground for a new trial under
subdivision (a)(3)); (Rule 59(a)(3) requires that the moving
parties show that ordinary prudence was exercised to guard
against the accident or surprise); Ericksen v. Wasatch Manor,
802 P.2d 1323 (Utah App. 1990); (because the depositions of three
witnesses were taken by the defendant, the defendant had notice
of the expected testimony.

Thus, no unfair surprise was shown

and a new trial was not warranted); see also: Chournos v.
D'Aanillo, 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982); Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d
695 (Utah 1977); Mver ex rel. Myer v. Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558
(Utah 1984).)
There is no case law interpreting Rule 59(a)(3) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which would allow this rule to
serve as the basis for a new trial when the accident or surprise
did not occur at trial, but rather which prevented a party from
attending trial.

Therefore, this is an appropriate basis on

which to grant a new trial.
However, even if the Rule 59(a)(3) was an appropriate
grounds for a new trial, Appellant failed to provide a sufficient
basis on which a new trial could be granted.

Under Utah law, a

trial judge in granting or denying a motion for a new trial has
10

broad latitude, and should not be overturned by an appellate
court absent a clear abuse of discretion by a trial judge.
Barson by and through Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682
P.2d 832 (Utah 1984); Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah
1982); Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981).

It is not an

abuse of discretion in this case for the trial court to have
found that there was an inadequate basis for the Appellant to
claim that he was prevented from attending trial due to accident
or surprise.
The Appellant has provided absolutely no medical
documentation in support of his position that he was
incapacitated on the day of his hearing.

The Appellant did

submit three affidavits in support of the proposition that he was
incapacitated on that day.

These affidavits are contained in

Exhibit E of Appellant's brief.

However, the documents found in

Exhibit J of Appellant's brief were never submitted to the trial
court for the trial court's us in its determination on the motion
for a new trial.

As suchf those documents constitute new

evidence which is inappropriate to present for the first time on
appeal.
Appellant filed his own affidavit stating that he was
incapacitated (see Exhibit E of Appellant's Brief).
Appellant has also submitted an affidavit of his apartment
building manager (see Exhibit E of Appellant's Brief) which
11

states that he had seen the Appellant incapacitated prior to the
day of the hearing.

The manager then stated that on the day of

the hearing, the Appellant did not come out of his apartment
until early evening.

The apartment manager does not claim to

have seen the Appellant incapacitated on the day of the hearing.
The only medical affidavit submitted by the Appellant is
the Affidavit of Michael Lowry, M.D. (see Exhibit E of
Appellant's Brief).

In his affidavit, Dr. Lowry does diagnose

the Appellant with mitral valve prolapse.

However, he does not

state that the symptoms of this condition actually result in
capacitation, and further, does not express an opinion as to
whether the Appellant actually became incapacitated on the day of
the hearing or even if it was likely that the Appellant became
incapacitated on that day.
Due to the lack of evidence supporting Appellant's
proposition that he was incapacitated on the day of the hearing,
it was not an abuse of discretion of the trial court to deny a
new trial.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
BY GRANTING JUDGMENT TO THE APPELLEE WHILE
THERE WERE OUTSTANDING RULE 11 MOTIONS AGAINST
APPELLEE'S COUNSEL.
During the course of litigation at the trial level, the
Appellant filed motions for sanctions against Appellee's counsel
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11. These motions had
12

not been ruled upon by the trial judge as of the date of the
dismissal of the case.

However, this is not a valid ground for

appeal since the motions for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 have
nothing whatsoever to do with the merits of the case and could
not in any way affect the judgment rendered.

Since this issue in

no way affects the judgment rendered in this casef it is not an
appropriate issue for this Court to address.
The 1983 Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, upon which Utah Rule of Civil Procedure is based
states:
A party seeking sanctions should give notice
to the court and the offending party promptly
upon discovering a basis for doing so.
However, it is anticipated that in the case of
pleadings, the sanctions issue under Rule 11
will normally be determined at the end of
litigation, and in the case of motions, at the
time when the motion is decided or shortly
thereafter. (emphasis added.)
Under this Advisory Committee Note, the trial court has the
discretion to rule on the propriety of sanctions under Rule 11 at
any time.

Since the Rule 11 motions have no bearing on the

outcome of the underlying case, which is an action for property
damage, the trial court is within his discretion to decide on the
propriety of sanctions at a time after a judgment in the
underlying case has been rendered.
Case law also supports this proposition:
It makes no difference that the district court
decided to impose the sanctions for the
13

litigation only after the post-judgment
motions, or that the court changed its prior
position with respect to sanctions in doing
so. The Advisory Committee Notes to Amended
Rule 11 explicitly state that vthe time when
sanctions are to be imposed rests in the
discretion of the trial judge.'
McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 803 F.2d 1197, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Not only was the trial court's decision to wait until the
end of litigation to decide on sanctions within the trial court's
discretion, but some cases have held that, as a general rule, a
trial court should wait until the end of litigation to decide on
Rule 11 sanctions.
A district court's decision of whether to
impose Rule 11 sanctions based on the
complaint should wait until the end of
litigation. See Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, Advisory Committee Note.
Donaldson v. Clark, 786 F.2d 1570, 1576 (11th Cir. 1986).
It is not a proper grounds for appeal to complain that a
trial court rendered judgment prior to the time Rule 11
sanctions were decided.
CONCLUSION
None of the three issues presented by Appellant provide a
basis on which to set aside the judgment.

The issue of "fraud

upon the court" is not properly before this Court since a claim
for "fraud upon the court" should be brought by separate action.
Moreover, the acts complained of by the Appellant do not amount
to "fraud upon the court."

The trial court did not abuse its

14

discretion by denying Appellant's motion for a new trial since
the Appellant moved for a new trial on inappropriate grounds and
the Appellant did not provide an adequate basis on which to grant
a new trial.

It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial

court to enter judgment against the Appellant while there were
motions for Rule 11 sanctions outstanding against Appellee's
counsel.
Accordingly, Appellee respectfully requests that this
Court affirm the trial court's rulings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ /

day of August, 1991.

HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

kdA

TSXf. /TSAJOOGOS

Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellee
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby xierrtify that//1 cajuwffed to be mailed postage
prepaid, on the «*** day of /n'ytisJy
1991, four true and
correct copies of the foregoing^ to the following:
William Paul Barron, Jr. Pro Se
11475 Holiday Way
Hillsboro OH 45133-9368
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Exhibit A

ORIGINAL
1

EXHIB-IT

P

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
;

2

SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, SALT LAKE COUNT1,

3
4

WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR.

5
6
7
8

* %

-oOo-

Case No. ^2p)L#A24 CW<5*

Plaintiff,

MOTION 1)6 DISMISS^

vs.

^

SOUTHLAND CORPORATION,
7-11 STORES, CITGO PETROLEUM
AND KEMPER GROUP,
Defendants.

9
10

-oOo-

11
12

BE IT REMEMBERED that/on the 16th day of July, 1990,

L3

the above-entitled matter came' on for hearing before the

L4

Honorable Paul G. Grant, sitting as Judge in the above-named

L5

Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the following

L6

proceedings were had.
-oOo-

L7
.8

APPEARANCES:

.9

For the Plaintiff:

No appearance

•0

For the Defendant:

MR. T. J. TSAKALOS
Attorney at Law
4 Triad Center, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah

:i

\Z
:3
:4
:5

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

84180

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3

THE COURT:

4

MR. TSAKALOSr

Barron vs. Southland Corporation,
(Inaudible) Taskalos on behalf Qf

5

Southland Corporation and Citgo Petroleum*

6

the hall, he's not here, we sent him notice of the trialf at

7

least the plaintiff in this matter.

8
9

THE COURT;

Let's give him five and if he doesn't come

I in, then we'll strike it*

10

MR. TASAKALOS:

11

Thank you, your Honor,

(Whereupon, the Court handled unrelated matters.)

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. TSAKALOS:

14

Itve checked down.

J

THE COURT:

15

Is Mr. Barron here?
Barron is not here, your Honor,

I presume I will hear your motion.

MR. TSAKALOS:

My motion is to dismiss with prejudice,

16

and for the Court record, Mr. Barron was driving his car and rap

17

into our pumps and sued us. And this—

18
19

THE COURT:

Well, why didn't your pumps get out of the

way?

20

MR. TSAKALOS: Well, because they weren't fast enough.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. TSAKALOSL

Oh.
I also brought a claim for bad faith in

Just for the record, in October of

L

23

this, your Honor.

89, he

24

brought a malpractice suit on his own against a doctor in L.D.S.

25

Hospital and IHC, and that has been dismissed.

On June 26, '89,

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

?

1

he sued Charter Summit Hospital and several people and that—

2

pro se, and that nas been dismissed.

3

Midvale.City and Midvale P.D. and that was dismissed.

4

October 31 of '89, he sued the State of California and the

5

California Department of Food & Agriculture, 'cause they stopped

6

him at the border, wouldn't allow him to bring in fruit and

7

vegetables.

8

Court.

9

has been dismissed.

On

That was dismissed in the United States District

On November 29, '89, he re-filed that suit again and that

10

November 16, '89, he sued the State of Utah and the

11
12

On June 25, '89, he sued

Utah State Tax Commission for his taxes.

I think that one has

J been dismissed, and then he sued us when our pumps did not get
out of his way, and now has not appeared.

14
15

THE COURT:
I much?

16
17

MR. TSAKALOS:
I

18
19

And your claim for attorneyls fees is how

THE COURT:

I will prepare an affidavit.

All right.

If you'll send that with the

judgment.
I

20 I

MR. TSAKALOS:

Thank you, your Honor

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

21
22 |

* * *

23
24
25
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY. SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

APPENDIX I>
1
2
C E R T I F I C A T E

3
4

5

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON. JR.
vs.
SOUTHLAND CORPORATION was electronically recorded by the
6 |
THIRD
Circuit Court,
SALT LAKE COUNTY
Utah.
9
That the said witnesses were, before examination, duly
10
sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
11 | the truth in said cause.
That the said testimony of said witnesses was electronicall)

recorded,
13

and thereafter

caused by me to be transcribed

into

t r e

) P writing, and that a true, and correct transcription of
14 J said testimony so taken and transcribed is set forth in the
foregoing pages numbered from 2
to __3
, inclusive
IS
and said witnesses testified and said as in the foregoing
16
annexed testimony.
17

ie

WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City, Utah,
this
29 day of
MAY •
, 19 91 .
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25
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